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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Caleb Michael Leonard appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress
evidence. In the district court, he asserted that the deputy who stopped his car lacked reasonable
suspicion for the stop, and, even if he possessed reasonable suspicion, he unlawfully prolonged
the stop. The district court denied the motion, and Mr. Leonard entered a conditional plea of
guilty to one count of possession of a controlled substance, which preserved his right to appeal
the denial of his motion to suppress. Mindful that an alleged speeding violation provided
reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop, and the deputy smelled marijuana before the owner of
the car provided proof of insurance for the car, Mr. Leonard asserts the district court erred when
it denied his motion to suppress because the deputy abandoned the only potentially legitimate
reason for the stop, and this unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In January of 2017, the State filed a complaint alleging that Mr. Leonard had committed
the crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. (R., pp.13-14.) At the
preliminary hearing, 1 Kootenai County Sheriff’s Deputy Hyle testified that he conducted a traffic
stop of the car Mr. Leonard was driving based on his observation that the car had crossed the fog
line and exceeded the speed limit. (2/23/17 Tr., p.5, L.25 – p.10, L.7; R., p.22.) Deputy Hyle
stated that his patrol vehicle was “set at 65 mile an hour,” and Mr. Leonard’s car was “pulling
away to an extent that [he] believe[d] it was traveling approximately 70 mile an hour.” (2/23/17

1

The parties stipulated to the district court relying on the transcript of the preliminary hearing,
and the video of the traffic stop, for the facts regarding the motion to suppress. (8/15/17 Tr., p.3,
L.8 – p.4, L.22.)
1

Tr., p.8, Ls.2-8.) However, he said he was never able to determine the car’s speed because it
slowed down right away. (2/23/17 Tr., p.8, L.19 – p.9, L.17.)
Deputy Hyle testified that he did not stop the car for speeding when he witnessed it;
instead, he continued following the car until he saw it “cross the fog line on the right side of the
road two times . . . .”2 (2/23/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.18-24; Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2: Camera 0 (“Video”) at
0:03 – 0:35.) He said he decided to stop the car at that point. (2/23/17 Tr., p.9, L.25 – p.10,
L.7.) He later testified that the video did not show the alleged speeding because it occurred
“longer than thirty seconds before” he activated his overhead lights. (2/23/17 Tr., p.74, Ls.2-17.)
After making the stop, Deputy Hyle approached the car and identified the driver as Mr. Leonard
and determined that the owner of the car was sitting in the passenger’s seat. (2/23/17 Tr., p.12,
L.6 – p.16, L.19; Video at 1:05 – 2:50.) At that point, he said, “Caleb, do you know what you’re
getting stopped for today?” (Video at 2:50 – 2:53.) Mr. Leonard said, “I do not, Officer.”
(Video at 2:53 – 2:55.) Deputy Hyle then said, “You crossed the fog line on the right side of the
road a couple times.” (Video at 2:55 – 3:00.) Mr. Leonard then said he was trying avoid
potholes in the road, and Deputy Hyle replied, “Okay, alright, I’ll buy that, I understand that, but
you understand with the icy roads, when you do that, and your little quick movement, you’re
going to spin out or wreck the car or something.” (Video at 3:05 – 3:15.) He then said he was
not going to give Mr. Leonard a ticket for crossing the fog line. (Video at 3:15 – 3:20.)
Throughout the course of stop, Deputy Hyle never mentioned the alleged speeding
violation. When asked at the preliminary hearing why he did not mention it, he said, “My
discretion was that the vehicle leaving its lane of travel was a bigger safety concern as leaving
the lane of travel is one of the top reasons . . . for causing crashes, and we couldn’t verify an

2

exact speed to tell them at which they were speeding . . . .” (2/23/17 Tr., p.13, L. 20, - p.14, L.4.)
When asked whether he ultimately documented his observation of the speeding, Deputy Hyle
said that he wrote it in his report after the stop.3 (2/23/17 Tr., p.15, L.1 – p.16, L.2; see R., p.22.)
Deputy Hyle said the owner of the car immediately provided the registration, but she
needed to search for proof of insurance while he waited. (2/23/17 Tr., p.16, L.18 – p.17, L.12;
Video at 1:45 – 4:45.)

He stated that, while he was speaking with her about insurance

documentation, he smelled marijuana. 4 (2/23/17 Tr., p.17, Ls.18-25; see Video at 4:40 – 4:50.)
Based on that, Deputy Hyle said he later searched the car and found, among other things, two
baggies in the center console, which contained a “white powder substance” that tested
presumptive positive for cocaine, a digital scale, a bong that had never been used, and a
container that had a “small amount of substance that [he] recognized to be marijuana . . .” in it.
(2/23/17 Tr., p.18, Ls.14-23, p.30, Ls.6-20.)
After the preliminary hearing, the case was bound over to the district court.5 (R., pp.74,
84-87.) Defense counsel filed a motion to suppress. (R., pp.64-65.) In his memorandum in
support of the motion, counsel argued that Deputy Hyle lacked reasonable suspicion for the
traffic stop because touching or crossing the fog line of a highway does not provide reasonable

2

In his police report, Deputy Hyle stated that he saw the tires of the car touch the fog line once
and cross the fog line once. (R., p.22.)
3
On cross-examination, Deputy Hyle acknowledged that he wrote his report after speaking with
other officers about the fact that touching or crossing the fog line may not provide reasonable
suspicion for a traffic stop. (2/23/17 Tr., p.59, L.11 – p.60, L.17.)
4
After the owner provided proof of insurance, Deputy Hyle again told Mr. Leonard that he was
going to issue a “written warning” for the “lane violation.” (Video at 5:40 – 5:55.)
5
The magistrate court’s order indicated that the preliminary hearing had been waived (R., p.56),
but counsel filed a motion to correct the bind over order (R., p.60), and the court later entered an
order binding the case over. (R., p.74.)
3

suspicion that a traffic violation has been committed.6 (R., pp.75-79.) Additionally, he argued
that the State could not rely on the alleged speeding violation as a basis to justify the traffic stop
because Deputy Hyle “never used it as a reason for the stop or detention . . . .” (R., pp.79-80.)
Subsequently, the district court held a hearing on the motion. At that hearing, defense
counsel argued that Deputy Hyle did not possess reasonable suspicion to make the stop based on
the car crossing the fog line or the alleged speeding violation. (8/15/17 Tr., p.4, L.24 – p.9, L.4.)
He also argued that, even if there was reasonable suspicion to make the stop based on the alleged
speeding, Deputy Hyle unlawfully prolonged the stop because he “abandoned the purpose of that
stop, the speeding, upon contacting the driver in this case.” (8/15/17 Tr., p.9, Ls.4-16.) He
argued that Deputy Hyle “never once brought up this issue of speeding” when speaking with
Mr. Leonard, and he “abandoned this speeding violation because . . . he had no proof of it.”
(8/15/17 Tr., p.10, L.21 – p.11, L.20.) As such, counsel explained that Deputy Hyle “abandoned
the purpose of the stop before he ever smelled marijuana in the car.” (8/15/17 Tr., p.12, Ls.1316.)
In response, the prosecutor argued that there was “a lawful reason for the stop” based on
the speeding and the car crossing the fog line. (8/15/17 Tr., p.15, L.6 – p.17, L.19.)

He also

argued that it was impossible to know what Deputy Hyle would have done about the alleged
speeding violation if he had not smelled the marijuana, and any extension of the stop was due to

6

Counsel cited to State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439 (2015) for the proposition that touching the fog
line did not violate the statute—I.C. § 49-637—requiring drivers to drive within a lane and thus
did not provide reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. (R., pp.78-79.) State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho
585, 588-90 (2018), in which this Court held that a temporary crossing of the fog line did not
violate the statute either, had not yet been issued when counsel filed his memorandum in support
of the motion to suppress. Notably, Fuller resulted from the State’s appeal of another Kootenai
County district court decision in which the court held that crossing the fog line did not provide
reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop. 163 Idaho at 586-87.
4

the owner of the car not being able to find proof of insurance. (8/15/17 Tr., p.18, L.18 – p.19,
L.24.) Defense counsel replied as follows: “I think the Court can determine what the Officer
would have done. It’s exactly what he did do in this case. He did nothing with the speeding,
never brought it up never gave a warning either verbal or written. He did nothing with it. We
know what the Officer would have done. He issued a warning for the line violation but none for
the speeding.” (8/15/17 Tr., p.20, L.24 – p.21, L.6.) Counsel went on to say that he could not
“imagine why the defendant’s license, registration, insurance had anything to do with whether or
not the Officer going to give him a warning for speeding,” and he argued that the prosecutor’s
argument did not make sense because officers do not change their minds about issuing a warning
for speeding based on whether a driver has a valid driver’s license, registration, and insurance.
(8/15/17 Tr., p.21, L.8 – p.22, L.11.)
The district court ruled on the motion to suppress from the bench. (8/15/17 Tr., p.22,
L.13 – p.33, L.17.) It stated that it found “nothing abnormal or improper at all about an officer
making” an observation that a vehicle is speeding and “then continuing to observe the vehicle
without” pulling it over. (8/15/17 Tr., p.25, Ls.8-14.) It noted that Deputy Hyle, “articulated
that he observed the vehicle exceeding the posted speed limit of 65 miles an hour,” and he “also
articulated that he observed the vehicle drive outside of the marked lane of travel by crossing the
fog lines.” (8/15/17 Tr., p.28, Ls.2-6.) It found that that those two bases for the stop had been
“established by specific facts,” and they provided reasonable suspicion to make the stop.7
(8/15/17 Tr., p.28, Ls.6-10.) It stated, “In this case, the Officers, as allowed by law, stopped the
vehicle and inquired of the driver regarding driver’s license, registration, and proof of

7

Presumably based on its finding that crossing the fog line provided reasonable suspicion for the
traffic stop, the district court did not address defense counsel’s argument that Deputy Hyle
abandoned pursuing the speeding violation. (8/15/17 Tr., p.24, L.20 – p.33, L.17.)
5

insurance.” (8/15/17 Tr., p.29, Ls.11-14.) The court also found that the owner’s search for proof
of insurance “quite naturally prolonged the stop and it was during this particular delay that the
Deputy smelled” marijuana.

(8/15/17 Tr., p.29, L.20 – p.30, L5.)

Based on this, it held

Mr. Leonard did not meet his burden of establishing that there was no reasonable suspicion to
make the stop, or that the stop was unlawfully prolonged. (8/15/17 Tr., p.33, Ls.3-14.) As such,
it denied the motion to suppress. (8/15/17 Tr., p.33, Ls.14-15; R., p.117.)
Subsequently, Mr. Leonard entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of possession
of a controlled substance. (R., pp.122, 124.)8 The district court withheld judgment and placed
Mr. Leonard on probation for two years. (R., pp.127-31.) Mr. Leonard filed a notice of appeal
timely from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.137-39.)

8

The “Order Permitting Conditional Plea” is on page seven of the 47-page electronic document,
which includes the Presentence Report.
6

ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Leonard’s motion to suppress because crossing the
fog line did not provide Deputy Hyle with reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop, and
Deputy Hyle’s abandonment of the alleged speeding violation unlawfully prolonged the stop?

7

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Leonard’s Motion To Suppress Because Crossing
The Fog Line Did Not Provide Deputy Hyle With Reasonable Suspicion To Make The Traffic
Stop, And Deputy Hyle’s Abandonment Of The Alleged Speeding Violation Unlawfully
Prolonged The Stop
A.

Introduction
Based on Deputy Hyle’s testimony that Mr. Leonard was speeding and had crossed the

fog line, the district court held the traffic stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. It also
held Deputy Hyle did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop. The district court erred when it
held that touching or crossing the fog line provided reasonable suspicion of a traffic violation.
Mindful that Deputy Hyle’s visual observation that the car was speeding provided reasonable
suspicion to make the stop, and he smelled marijuana before the owner of the car provided proof
of insurance, Mr. Leonard asserts that Deputy Hyle’s abandonment of the speeding violation as
the basis for the stop unlawfully prolonged the traffic stop.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a motion to

suppress. State v. Wulff, 157 Idaho 416, 418 (2014). The Court will accept “the trial court’s
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but may freely review the trial court’s
application of constitutional principles in light of those facts.”

Id.

“Determinations of

reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo.” State v. Morgan, 154 Idaho 109, 111 (2013).
Constitutional questions are also reviewed de novo. State v. Dunlap, 155 Idaho 345, 377 (2013).

8

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Leonard’s Motion To Suppress
Searches or detentions conducted without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); State v. Butcher, 137 Idaho 125, 129
(Ct. App. 2002). The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article 1
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution protect “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const.
amend. IV; Idaho Const. art. 1, § 17. The purpose of this constitutional right is to “impose a
standard of reasonableness upon the exercise of discretion by governmental agents and thereby
safeguard the individual’s privacy and security against arbitrary invasions.” State v. Maddox,
137 Idaho 821, 824 (Ct. App. 2002) (citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)).
An Idaho traffic stop “constitutes a seizure of the motorist and is therefore subject to Fourth
Amendment strictures, but because it is limited in scope and duration, it is analogous to an
investigative detention . . . .” State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 644 (Ct. App. 2008) (citing
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653).
The United States Supreme Court has held that “an investigative detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Similarly,
the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive means reasonably available to
verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period of time.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491,
500 (1983). To implement this standard, the Court has explained, “In assessing whether a
detention is too long in duration to be justified as an investigative stop, we consider it
appropriate to examine whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was
likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain
the defendant.” United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).

9

A seizure justified only by a police-observed traffic violation, therefore, “‘become[s]
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’ of
issuing a ticket for the violation.” Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614-15 (2015)
(quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005)). The Rodriguez Court made it clear that
unless there was additional reasonable suspicion, the officer had to allow the seized person to
depart once the purpose of the stop was completed. Id. at 1614. Similarly, relying on Rodriguez,
this Court held that an officer’s abandonment of the original purpose of the stop unlawfully
prolongs a seizure. State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 609 (2016). It stated, “[S]hould the officer
abandon the purpose of the stop, the officer no longer has that original reasonable suspicion
supporting his actions.” Id. And it clarified that, “unless some new reasonable suspicion or
probable arises to justify the seizure’s new purpose, a seized party’s Fourth Amendment rights
are violated when the original purpose of the stop is abandoned (unless that abandonment falls
within some established exception).” Id.
Temporarily crossing or touching a fog line does not provide an officer with reasonable
suspicion that a traffic violation has been committed. State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585, 588-90
(2018); State v. Neal, 159 Idaho 439, 446 (2015).9 Therefore, the district court erred in holding
that crossing the fog line contributed to the totality of circumstances, which provided Deputy
Hyle with reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Leonard. (See 8/15/17 Tr., p.28, Ls.4-10.) An
officer’s visual observation of a speeding violation can provide reasonable suspicion for a traffic
stop. “Reasonable suspicion is derived from what an officer observes and interprets based upon

9

With respect to Neal, the district court wrote that “the Court simply held that a traffic stop is
justified if the Officer has reasonable suspicion to believe the driver committed a traffic offense.”
(8/15/17 Tr., p.27, Ls.18-21.) Thus, it failed to recognize that Neal held that the fog line is part
of the roadway. 159 Idaho at 446. Fuller relied on this same reasoning. 163 Idaho at 590.
10

the officer’s training and experience. ‘[T]he law does not require that every police officer have
with him a narcotics sniffing dog, a panoramic breathylizer [sic ], a radar gun, or a decibel
counter to verify what he smells or sees or hears.’” State v. Meyer, 158 Idaho 953, 956 (Ct. App.
2015) (citation omitted). Therefore, Deputy Hyle was justified in stopping Mr. Leonard on this
basis, but his visual estimate that Mr. Leonard was exceeding the speed limit by five miles per
hour (2/23/17 Tr., p.8, Ls.2-8) was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the car
was speeding. See State v. Estes, 148 Idaho 345, 349 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding that an officer’s
testimony regarding his visual estimate that a car was traveling ten miles over the speed limit
was not sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the car was speeding).
Mindful that the alleged speeding violation provided reasonable suspicion to make the
traffic stop, and mindful that Deputy Hyle smelled marijuana prior to the owner of the car
providing proof of insurance, Mr. Leonard asserts that Deputy Hyle’s affirmative statement to
Mr. Leonard about why he pulled him over proved he abandoned the only potentially legitimate
purpose for the stop. While Deputy Hyle may have had reasonable suspicion to make the stop
based on the speeding violation, he abandoned that basis to pursue the fog line issue only. Neal
and Fuller make it clear this did not provide reasonable suspicion that Mr. Leonard had
committed a traffic violation. And, because Deputy Hyle did not pursue the speeding violation,
he abandoned the only reasonable suspicion that would have supported the seizure. Therefore,
he unlawfully prolonged the stop.

11

CONCLUSION
Mr. Leonard respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order of
judgment and commitment and reverse the order denying his motion to suppress.
DATED this 4th day of June, 2019.

/s/ Reed P. Anderson
REED P. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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